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I. INTRODUCTION
It is almost impossible to overstate the role of electronic markets (e-markets) in today’s economy. The estimated
seasonally adjusted 2009 third quarter U.S. retail e-commerce sales totaled $34 billion—a 1.8 percent increase over
the same quarter of 2008 [U.S. Census Bureau News, 2009]. A major promise of e-markets is their ability to reach
customers in various countries. With this promise, early research in the e-commerce area suggests that the Internet
will unite a global economy, allowing different markets across national boundaries to be more homogeneous [Bakos,
1997]. Some prior research suggested otherwise and supported the idea that heterogeneities would be expected
across markets in various countries (e.g., de Mooij and Hofstede, 2002; Peng and Jan, 2009). Although an Internet
store can be reached virtually by online users around the world, there exists limited research in the area of market
dispersion and auction success predictors across national boundaries, especially in the e-auction environment.
In recent Information Systems (IS) research, several attempts have been made to investigate the impact of
electronic commerce on pricing dimensions such as price levels, price transparency, and price dispersion. For
example, the commercialization of the Internet was claimed to be one of the driving forces for businesses to reduce
their product prices due to the increased competition among retailers [Bakos, 1998]. Soh and her colleagues
presented evidence of how price transparency or lack thereof affects success of electronic marketplaces [Soh et al.,
2006]. Such transparency allows IS researchers to observe that changes in price in online computer markets occur
in a synchronized fashion among online sellers [Oh and Lucas, 2006]. The change in prices made by the online
retailers produces a phenomenon called price dispersion, which later received growing interest from the IS
community (e.g., Ba et al., 2011 forthcoming; Bock et al., 2007; Chen and Hitt, 2001; Walter et al., 2006).
The current research investigates two entities of market dispersion—price and number of bidders. Price dispersion is
commonly studied in the form of price variability (e.g., Ba et al., 2011 forthcoming; Baye and Morgan, 2001; Pan et
al., 2002). It benefits merchants because it is a reflection of a firm’s strategy to avoid price predictability by
customers [Baye et al., 2004b]. Suppliers use variability in prices to differentiate their offerings and make their
brands or products more distinctive or more desirable as compared with competitors [Redmond, 2002]. Price
dispersion, however, can harm consumers through higher search costs and potential errors in their purchase
decisions [LeClair, 2006].
Most research on price dispersion has been conducted in fixed-price markets where merchants largely determine
prices. We argue that electronic auction (e-auction) markets are viable environments to observe levels of price
dispersion mainly because prices are allowed to vary according to buyers’ and sellers’ preferences and actions. For
example, prices may vary with auction durations, starting prices, buy-it-now prices, reserve prices required for an
item to sell, and sellers’ performance indicated by feedback scores and comments (e.g., Ba and Pavlou, 2002;
Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007; Song and Baker, 2007; Standifird and Roelofs, 2005). Buyer-related factors such as
timing of bids, frequency of bids, and number of unique bidders can also influence the final price of an item (e.g.,
Bapna et al., 2004; Segev et al., 2001; Song and Baker, 2007; Wilcox, 2000).
The dynamic nature of e-auction transactions allows researchers to observe not only price dispersion across
different transactions but also dispersion in the number of bidders. In the auction context, bidders are imperative to
auction success. As the number of unique bidders increases, the success rate of the auctions increases [Akula and
Menascé, 2007]. Prior research, however, focuses primarily on price dispersion, and, to the best of our knowledge,
no research provides an empirically-based discussion of bidder dispersion. To achieve our goal of investigating
dispersion and auction success in e-auctions, we employ data from eBay in three different countries: Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The primary purposes of our research are to explore the heterogeneities in
(1) e-auction dispersion in price and number of bidders and (2) variables that influence auction success (final auction
price) across e-auction markets in the three countries of interest.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Dispersion
in Price and
Number
of Biddersand Factors that Predict Auction Success of a
Exploring
Market
Dispersion
The current
research investigates
dispersion
in terms
of price and
number of bidders. Price dispersion is defined as
Commodity:
The Case
of Three
E-Auction
Markets
the distribution of or variance in price for identical products across sellers [Chen and Hitt, 2001; Pan et al., 2002].
The emergence of electronic markets greatly renewed researchers’ interest in this topic. Initial efforts were mostly
directed at comparing relative amounts of price dispersion in electronic markets to that in traditional markets (see
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Table 1). Early expectations predicted lower price dispersion in e-markets relative to traditional ones. Yet empirical
evidence provides ambiguous results. Some studies found comparable price dispersion in electronic and traditional
markets, and others found differences in the two market types [Bailey, 1998; Pan et al., 2004; Scholten and Smith,
2002; Stylianou et al., 2005]. For example, consumers paid up to a 60 percent difference in prices across different
online merchants, with 28 percent of this price dispersion unexplained by disparities across merchants [Baye et al.,
2004b].
Table 1 provides a summary of relevant research studies explaining price dispersion in e-business. The commonly
studied variables used to explain price dispersion in electronic markets are type of retailer (i.e., e-tailers—retailers
using electronic channels only versus traditional and multichannel retailers), service quality heterogeneity, and
asymmetrically informed consumers. As indicated by Table 1, there is no consistent agreement across studies about
the effect of the variables on price dispersion. Nonetheless, a brief synthesis of the research indicates some
common findings. It is often found that price dispersion is higher among e-tailers compared to traditional and
multichannel retailers, though there are exceptions to this finding. Service and product category differences among
e-tailers do not completely explain price dispersion. Price dispersion among e-tailers is positively related to
asymmetrically informed consumers but is not adequately explained by heterogeneity of consumer search costs.
The influence of the number of e-tailers on price dispersion is ambiguous. Price dispersion among e-tailers has not
diminished over time. Limited research conducted on other factors found to influence price dispersion among etailers includes the effects of sales promotions, market development, country, and product evaluation factors (but not
product lifecycle stage or product popularity).
There has been some consensus in theories that aim to explain price dispersion. In their review of the literature,
Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000] identified three main explanations for price dispersion: search costs; asymmetric
information across consumers; and product heterogeneity. Grover, Lim, and Ayyagari [2006] posited three
theoretical reasons to explain price dispersion: search cost, service differentiation, and market characteristics. Baylis
and Perloff [2002] offered three drivers of price dispersion: market immaturity [Bock et al., 2007; Brynjolfsson and
Smith, 2000]; firms’ oligopolistic strategies to raise or lower prices over time, both collectively and randomly [Shilony,
1977; Varian, 1980]; and service premiums [Varian, 1999]. Within these three studies, we observe three broad
themes that are used to explain price dispersion: (1) asymmetric information and search costs, (2) differences in
products and/or services, and (3) differences in market characteristics or market maturity.
In Stigler’s seminal work regarding traditional markets, he argued price dispersion was due to ―ignorance in the
market‖ [Stigler, 1961, p. 214]. Since then, researchers maintain that lack of information is one of the primary
explanations for price dispersion in both online and traditional markets. The Internet, however, provides a breadth of
information not available in traditional markets to consumers for comparing products and prices at a relatively low
cost [Bailey, 1998; Bakos, 1997; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Grover et al., 2006; Li et al., 2009]. This
characteristic of electronic markets arguably decreases both price dispersion as well as the average price charged
for a particular item. Nevertheless price dispersion does exist and is prevalent in electronic markets [Walter et al.,
2006].
Differences in the products and services offered as well as e-tailer differences result in price dispersion in the market
[Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Grover, Lim, and Ayyagari, 2006]. Retailers with higher brand awareness among
consumers gain higher prices than their competitors [Chen and Hitt, 2001]. Service quality (i.e., reliability, shopping
convenience, product information, and shipping and handling) explains very little e-tailer’s pricing power [Pan et al.,
2002]. In fact, Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar [2002] and Baylis and Perloff [2002] found that price can go down with
increased service—a finding that contradicts most commonly held beliefs. Ba, Stallaert, and Zhang [2011
forthcoming] later attempted to explain such a phenomenon by investigating the interplay between firm recognition
and service and its affect on price dispersion. In short, they found that highly recognized and less recognized firms
exhibited different relationships between price and their provided services. In addition, the identity of high-priced and
low-priced firms generally remained consistent over time [Baylis and Perloff, 2002], contradicting previous studies
(e.g., Baye et al., 2004b). Other researchers attributed price dispersion to firms’ strategies of mixed pricing to
prevent consumers from learning which stores offer the lowest prices [Baye et al., 2004b; Varian, 1980].
The only studies we found that compared price dispersion across national boundaries are those of Rupert, Gatti, and
Kattuman [2003] and Bock, Lee, and Li [2007]. While they were both carried out in fixed-price e-markets, the two
studies focused on different aspects of the market. Rupert, Gatti, and Kattuman [2003] focused on supply factors,
while Bock, Lee, and Li [2007] focused on demand factors (i.e., buyer). The first study unmasked price dispersion of
thirty-one products in seven European countries [Rupert et al., 2003]. Their study collected data over the course of
thirty weeks. The price information was downloaded weekly from a price listing service website called Kelkoo. Their
results confirmed varying degrees of price dispersion across countries. Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden exhibited
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Table 1: Summary of Key Research Findings—Explanatory Variables Predicting
e-Business Price Dispersion
Key Findings
Explanatory Variable: Type of Retailer
 Higher than expected price dispersion was found among e-tailers (i.e.,
retailers using only electronic channels) compared to traditional and
multichannel retailers [Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000].
 Price dispersion is greater for e-tailers compared to multichannel retailers
[Stylianou, Kumar, and Robbins, 2005].
 Price dispersion for homogenous products among e-retailers is greater
than the price dispersion among traditional retailers [Bailey, 1998].
 Among e-tailers, traditional retailers, and multichannel retailers, e-tailers
exhibit the widest range of prices, but the lowest variability (standard
deviation). Multichannel retailers exhibit the highest variability in prices
[Ancarani and Shankar, 2004].
 In the U.S. and China, e-tailers realize lower price dispersion than
multichannel retailers [Bock, Lee, and Li, 2007].
 After controlling for e-tailer service quality, retailer type explains some price
dispersion. For six of eight product categories, e-tailer prices are lower than
multichannel retailer prices [Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar, 2002].
Explanatory Variable: Service Quality Heterogeneity
 Service levels and brand recognition explain the majority of an e-tailer's
effect on price dispersion. High-service/high-recognition is positively related
to price. For low service e-tailers, there is a negative association between
service and price [Ba, Stallaert, and Zhang, 2011 forthcoming].
 Differences in service do not result in price dispersion for e-tailers [Baylis
and Perloff, 2002].
 Price dispersion is not adequately explained by service differences among
e-tailers [Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000].
 Differences in e-tailer service quality explain price dispersion only to a
limited extent. Results suggest heterogeneity of e-tailer services may not
result in price premiums [Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar, 2002].
Explanatory Variable: Asymmetrically Informed Consumers
 Price dispersion is a result of e-tailers varying prices for informed and
uninformed consumers [Baylis and Perloff, 2002].
 Information overload and equivocality regarding product quality are
statistically significant and positively related to price dispersion in e-tailers
[Grover, Lim, and Ayyagari, 2006].
 For e-tailers, price dispersion is not explained adequately by informed
versus uninformed consumers [Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000].
Explanatory Variable: Product Category
 Price dispersion is a prevalent feature of e-tailers across all product
categories [Rupert, Gatti, and Kattuman, 2003].
 Price dispersion is prevalent across all product categories for e-tailers
[Walter, Gupta, and Su, 2006].

Explanatory Variable: Number of Sellers
 Price dispersion is greater when small numbers of e-tailers list prices
compared to large numbers of e-tailers [Baye, Morgan, and Scholten,
2004a].
 Influence of number of e-tailers in a market on price dispersion is
ambiguous (depending on measure of price dispersion used and country of
consideration) [Rupert, Gatti, and Kattuman, 2003].
Volume 29
348

Article 19

Units of Study
Books, music CDs

Twelve over-the-counter
pharmaceutical products
Books, music CDs, computer
software
Books, CDs

Books, music CDs, digital
cameras
Books, music CDs, DVDs,
computer software, computer
hardware, consumer electronics
DVDs, projector replacement
bulbs, external hard drives,
global positioning systems
(GPS) equipment
Digital cameras, flatbed
scanners
Books, music CDs
Books, music CDs, DVDs,
computer software, computer
hardware, consumer electronics
Digital cameras, flatbed
scanners
Consumer electronics, computer
hardware
Books, music CDs

Printers, PDAs, scanners, game
consoles, computer games,
music CDs
PDAs, groceries, hotel rooms,
airline tickets, flowers
(commodity products); books,
music CDs, toys, videotapes
(quasi-commodity products);
shoes, furniture, online trading
service, fragrances, wine
(differentiated products)
Consumer electronics

Printers, PDAs, scanners, game
consoles, computer games,
music CDs

Table 1: Summary of Key Research Findings—Explanatory Variables Predicting
e-Business Price Dispersion - Continued
Key Findings
Units of Study
Explanatory Variable: Consumer Search Costs
PDAs, groceries, hotel rooms,
 The Internet does not compress search-cost heterogeneity for consumers
airline tickets, flowers
[Walter, Gupta, and Su, 2006].
(commodity products); books,
music CDs, toys, videotapes
(quasi-commodity products);
shoes, furniture, online trading
service, fragrances, wine
(differentiated products)
Books, music CDs
 Price dispersion among e-tailers is not adequately explained by consumer
search costs [Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000].
Explanatory Variable: Time
Consumer electronics
 Price dispersion among e-tailers is not diminishing over time [Baye,
Morgan, and Scholten, 2004a].
Twenty consumer goods
 Price dispersion in 2000 for both traditional retail and e-tail markets is at
(traditional retail markets);
least as large as that observed in traditional retail markets in 1976. Price
Eleven consumer goods
dispersion in e-tail markets and traditional retail markets is about the same
(electronic retail markets)
in 2000 [Scholten and Smith, 2002].
Explanatory Variable: Others
Consumer electronics
 Price dispersion is a result of short-term, unpredictable price promotions
used by e-tailers to avoid price competition [Baye, Morgan, and Scholten,
2004b].
Books, music CDs, digital
 Price dispersion in more developed online markets (U.S. e-tailers) is
cameras
significantly lower than in less developed online markets (China e-tailers)
[Bock, Lee, and Li, 2007].
 Product life-cycle stage and product popularity do not explain much e-tailer Books, music CDs, DVDs,
computer software, computer
price dispersion [Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar, 2002].
hardware, consumer electronics
Printers, PDAs, scanners, game
 Significant differences found in the degree of price dispersion across econsoles, computer games,
tailers in different countries [Rupert, Gatti, and Kattuman, 2003].
music CDs
PDAs, groceries, hotel rooms,
 Effect of product evaluation factors on e-tailer price dispersion depends on
airline tickets, flowers
the product [Walter, Gupta, and Su, 2006].
(commodity products); books,
music CDs, toys, videotapes
(quasi-commodity products);
shoes, furniture, online trading
service, fragrances, wine
(differentiated products)
greater price dispersion more consistently than the other countries. Spain and France exhibited the lowest degree of
price dispersion. They argued that the relative development of electronic markets among countries (as indicated by
the number of firms listing prices in each market, that is, number of suppliers) was one of the drivers of these results.
For example, price dispersion markedly increased as the number of firms selling online changed from two to eight or
more.
The latter study focused on demand factors (i.e., buyer) and involved the concept of Internet market maturity [Bock
et al., 2007]. They argued that a more mature market would exhibit lower price dispersion. They defined market
maturity as the developmental level of Internet infrastructure and the adoption level of the Internet by users. Different
buyer/user factors related to Internet technology, such as the number of Internet users and online spending per
buyer, influenced their concept of market maturity. They collected prices of three products (books, CDs, and digital
cameras) in the U.S. and China and found significantly lower price dispersion in the U.S. markets for all three
products. They argued that their finding provided a confirmation of the Internet maturity effect—which assumes that
as Internet technologies become more widespread, price dispersion declines because there are more buyers in the
market. They encouraged more studies to be conducted in an international context to further examine the role of
Information Technologies on price dispersion.
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In addition to price dispersion, our study explores dispersion in number of bidders in e-auction markets. Relatively
little research exists on the topic of bidder dispersion, especially in regard to e-markets. Research tangential to
bidder dispersion indicates that the volatility and unpredictability of customer demand is amplified and growing,
especially in highly competitive markets [Cachon et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2008]. This volatility of demand is
attributable to accelerating economic cycles, strong competition, unpredictable consumer preferences, and the rapid
advancement of products [Huang et al., 2008]. In fixed-price markets, decreased dispersion in the number of
customers makes demand forecasting easier and more accurate [Gilliland, 2003; Huang et al., 2008]. It is easier to
match customers’ preferences, and thus increase the opportunity for profit maximization [Waller, 2004]. In other
words, if a firm can better meet customer needs, prices and revenues can be maximized [Waller, 2004]. While
demand predictability is generally a goal in markets, it is implied that sellers willing to deal with demand volatility and
the associated risk premiums may benefit from higher returns [Bekaert and Harvey, 1997].
One of this study’s prime objectives is to explore heterogeneities in dynamic pricing and bidder environments.
Although prior studies provide evidence indicating price dispersion is both ubiquitous and persistent, not much
research regarding dispersion in the number of bidders exists. While a substantial amount of e-auction research
exists, no studies to the best of our knowledge explore dispersion in prices and number of bidders across different eauction markets. We argue that while much attention is given to observing and studying price dispersion in fixedprice and auction markets—in terms of how auction prices are formed or what helps shape price premiums for
auction sellers—more efforts should be directed at studying both dynamic pricing and bidder environments of eauction markets. Our discussion above indicates that different markets exhibit varying levels of dispersion in price
and the number of bidders. Rupert, Gatti, and Kattuman [2003] suggest this differing dispersion is particularly true
for markets in different countries. Therefore, the current study examines dispersion in prices and number of bidders
across different e-auction markets. Our first research question and its associated hypotheses are:
Research Question I: Is there heterogeneity in dispersion of price and the number of bidders for a commodity
across e-auction markets?
H1a: Heterogeneity in dispersion of final auction price for a commodity across e-auction markets exists.
H1b: Heterogeneity in dispersion of the number of bidders for a commodity across e-auction markets exists.

Auction Success Predictors
As mentioned above, the second goal of our study is to demonstrate that various auction factors (e.g., seller
feedback, auction duration, and opening bid) influence auction success differently in different e-auction markets.
Auction success factors can be operationalized in many ways. Using a dummy variable, Gilkeson and Reynolds
[2003] identified a materialized auction (i.e., an auction that resulted in a sale, where at least one bid exceeded a
minimum or reserve price if used by a seller) as success. However, we argue that using final auction price is more
appropriate for many reasons. First, it has been used more frequently in the literature (e.g., Akula and Menascé,
2007; Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007). Second, varying levels of final auction prices can reflect
influences of different auction design factors and sellers’ strategies. A myriad of proposed models attempt to explain
the factors that shape final auction price—most of which employ regression models (e.g., Ba and Pavlou, 2002;
Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007). These prior studies provide us with a framework upon which to build. Very frequently,
the number of bidders, seller feedback, opening bid, and auction duration are used as independent variables in
predicting auction success (e.g., Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007).
Number of bidders is employed as a predictor of auction success mainly because to complete an auction, bidder
participation at some level is necessary [Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003]. The number of bidders can enhance the
success rate of an auction (i.e., an auction with a winner). For example, Akula and Menascé separately analyzed
over 2,000 product categories from Yahoo! auctions and found that each product category will have success
approaching 100 percent (all auctions are sold) if its average number of bidders passes the threshold of fifteen
unique bidders [Akula and Menascé, 2007]. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the addition of a bidder can raise
the final auction price approximately 2 percent [Dewally and Ederington, 2006]. It is conjectured that as the
competition heats up, bidders become more emotional as commitment escalates, and ultimately bid more than they
initially anticipated [Staw, 1981]. In contrast, in a study of computer auctions it was found that each additional bidder
encouraged existing bidders to lower their bids by approximately 1 percent [Yin, 2006]. Such a phenomenon can be
explained in the situation where auction participation is largely driven by opportunistic bidders who are actively
engaged in finding a good deal [Bapna et al., 2000]. It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the underlying
causes of these mixed results. Rather, we draw on past literature to demonstrate potential heterogeneities in
predictors of final auction price.
Heightened and exacerbated risk is a prominent feature of digital transactions and trust issues are further
compounded in short-term relationships, such as those observed in e-auction markets. Accordingly, buyer-provided
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feedback about sellers is necessary to demonstrate trustworthiness to prospective bidders and, therefore, most
electronic markets and auction sites publish comments, scores, and/or rankings [Utz et al., 2009]. Accumulated
evidence shows that sellers with relatively high positive feedback scores or relatively low negative feedback scores
receive higher price premiums and fewer transaction disputes compared to sellers with relatively low positive or high
negative feedback scores in e-auction markets (e.g., Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007; MacInnes et al., 2005). Feedback
scores, especially the negative ones, are indicative of a seller’s future performance [Gregg and Scott, 2006]. In one
study, the positive and negative feedback scores explain approximately 30 percent of sellers’ price premiums in eauctions and approximately 57 percent of bidders’ trust [Ba and Pavlou, 2002]. Similarly, highly reputable sellers in
auctions are found to receive almost an 8 percent higher price premium, compared to new sellers [Resnick et al.,
2006].
Opening auction bid is another variable that is frequently used to predict final auction price with various explanations
of the relationship. It is postulated that different levels of opening bids could send different signals to buyers in terms
of product quality [Milgrom and Roberts, 1986]. This proposition is largely used to explain the final price of items
whose values cannot be easily determined, such as antiques and used vehicles. Many prior studies selectively
employ commodity-like products and electronics as their products to rule out this signaling effect and allow a fair
comparison (e.g., Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Reynolds et al., 2009; Song and Baker, 2007). Despite this product
selection approach, there are still mixed findings in the relationship between final auction price and opening bid. For
example, relatively low opening bids draw more competition to auctions, resulting in increased final prices [Bajari
and Hortacsu, 2003; Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Reynolds et al., 2009; Standifird, 2001]. Yet such a strategy also
increases sellers’ risk of having low bids and risk-averse sellers protect themselves with high opening bids
[Reynolds et al., 2009; Schlägel and Wolff, 2007].
Mixed findings are also evident in the auction duration and price relationship. For instance, Lucking-Reiley [2000]
argued that auction duration could increase average auction price through increased bidder participation; however, it
was found that longer auction durations do not necessarily produce higher revenues to sellers [Bapna et al., 2001;
Hou, 2007]. Another study in this area showed a positive correlation between consumer surplus and auction duration
in auctions with durations of five to seven days [Bapna et al., 2008]. For low-priced products, relatively long auction
durations can be detrimental to sellers’ revenues. Some argue that inexpensive products do not need long auction
durations because buyers of these products are willing to pay more for immediate product acquisition
[Muthitacharoen et al., Working Paper].
Our literature review identified a few studies that compared predictors of final price across multiple countries. For
instance, Hou [2007] used eBay data from computer monitor auctions and found that both opening bids and sellers’
positive feedback exhibited significant positive relationships with final auction price in both the U.S. and Chinese
markets. A significantly negative relationship was found between sellers’ negative feedback and final auction price in
both markets. Auction duration was not found to be predictive of final price.
In a study of three auction markets, it was found that negative feedback significantly influenced the price of CDs in
Demark and the U.K. though not in the U.S. market [Schlägel and Wolff, 2007]. Positive feedback was found
significantly related to final auction price only for U.S. and U.K. markets. Only in the U.S. were opening bids for
digital cameras a significant predictor of the final price. Auction duration was found to influence final auction price of
video consoles in the U.S. market negatively—an antithesis to results found in prior studies (e.g., Lucking-Reiley et
al., 2007; Standifird, 2001). Clearly, predictors of final price vary among countries, and this leads us to our second
research question and its associated hypothesis.
Research Question II: Is there heterogeneity in the set of success predictors for a commodity across e-auction
markets?
H2:

Heterogeneity exists in the set of factors that predict final auction price for a commodity across e-auction
markets.

The predictor variables of final auction price were selected based on prior e-auction research (e.g., Lucking-Reiley et
al., 2007). For example, opening auction bid was used to test empirically the expectation of standard auction theory
that there is no effect of opening bid on final auction price when there is more than one bidder because the opening
bid is not binding, versus the alternative that it operates as a reference point that influences the levels of bidders’
bids [Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007]. Based on eBay data from 1999, Lucking-Reiley et al. [2007] found that auction
duration positively influenced final auction price. However, they postulated that at some point this effect could
decline over time in e-auction markets because of the significant increase in eBay bidders. Auction duration was
used to test this contention empirically. Other predictors we used in our analysis include number of bidders and
feedback scores. Standard auction theory indicates that the number of bidders influences the final auction price,
such that as the number of bidders increases, the final auction price increases [Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003]. Seller
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feedback variables were used to test for various extents of effect of positive versus negative feedback on final price
[Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007].

III. RESEARCH METHOD
An iPod Nano 2GB was selected as the product of focus for this study because it is a universal product, widely used
around the world, and available in the three countries being studied. The choice of this product is in accord with prior
research on price dispersion that frequently used commodity-like products to ensure a fair comparison and rule out a
signaling effect attributable to different levels of product quality. Thus eBay auction websites in three different
markets, specifically, Australia, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States (U.S.) were chosen because of
their similarities in language and eBay auction rules (e.g., hard-closing auctions), as well as the availability of the
selected product in the three markets. Currently eBay has more than 90 million users—mostly in the United States.
There are over 8 million and 14 million users in Australia and United Kingdom, respectively. While consumer interest
level and perceived value may vary across markets, examining each market independently of the other markets will
demonstrate heterogeneities in dispersion and predictors of auction success.
Two spider programs were developed to collect data from the three eBay auction websites. The data were collected
from early October 2007 to early December 2007. The first program identified new auction listings that matched the
provided keyword (iPod 2GB) by going to the auction websites every two hours. Once the program found matching
items, it downloaded the listing information, start date/time, and end date/time and stored the HTML information in
an SQL server database. These data were later extracted and used to monitor the auctions. Immediately after an
auction ended, the other spider program downloaded additional information such as seller feedback scores, final
auction price, and number of bidders.

Sample
Online auction data of new iPods Nano 2GB were collected over a two-month period, producing an initial sample
size of 2,950. The data cleaning process eliminated 1,299 data points, rendering a final sample of 1,651. The
majority of data that was eliminated included used iPods, iPod accessories, and bundled items. The data were later
migrated from the SQL server database to an SPSS program for the analysis.
Table 2 shows the sample characteristics. Of the 1,651 auction samples, 231 were transactions from the Australian
eBay, 342 were from the U.K. eBay, and 1,078 were from the U.S. eBay. Such a distribution indicates that the U.S.
is a much larger market. The largest number of sellers was found in the U.S. market. The data indicated a total of
94, 154, and 601 unique sellers in the Australian market, the U.K. market, and the U.S. market, respectively.
Although most sellers in the three markets were individual sellers or those with only one iPod Nano 2GB for sale, the
largest number of business sellers were found in the U.S. market. Twenty-two of the U.S. sellers held at least five
similar auctions. In terms of bidders, the Australian market displayed the smallest number of unique participating
bidders. There were 2,253 and 6,650 unique bidders in the U.K. and the U.S. markets, respectively. Interestingly,
the data showed that forty-one bidders (0.39 percent) participated in cross-country bidding. Only two of them won
the cross-country auctions.

Auction Transactions
Unique Sellers
Unique Bidders

Table 2: Sample Characteristics
Australia
United Kingdom United States
231
342
1,078
94
154
601
1,656
2,253
6,650

Total
1,651
849
10,559

Measurement
The auction success factor—final auction price—was extracted directly from the auction HTML page immediately
upon the conclusion of an auction. Because auction transactions took place in different monetary currencies, a
common currency was needed to ensure a fair comparison. Currency units were converted to the U.S. dollar using
the daily currency exchange rate provided on www.x-rates.com. Such a conversion was necessary for performing
tests of the hypotheses (e.g., a test of homogeneity of variance in prices).
The opening auction bids were extracted directly from the auction HTML page. Auction duration was calculated
using the start date/time and end date/time of an auction. The number of bidders was extracted at the end of each
auction. Two measures of seller feedback were collected—positive and negative feedback scores. The approach
adopted in prior studies was followed to transform seller feedback scores by using log transformations [Ba and
Pavlou, 2002; Lucking-Reiley, 2000; MacInnes et al., 2005]. As Ba and Pavlou [2002] argue, there are diminishing
marginal benefits of a positive (or negative) rating. Specifically, one more positive (or negative) feedback rating has
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more impact for an individual who has no or few feedback ratings as compared to an individual who already has
many positive (or negative) ratings. For example, a new seller who just started selling items is in more need of
having positive feedback than those who have received many positive feedback ratings before. Case in point, eBay
bidders are protected up to $2,000 if they use PayPal to buy items from sellers with fifty feedback scores or more
and at least 98 percent of them are positive (http://reviews.ebay.com/Buyer-Tips-For-Buying-Protection_W0QQugid
Z10000000005451556). Once an individual has many positive (or negative) feedback ratings, one more positive (or
negative) feedback rating gives little additional information about the seller’s past performance [Ba and Pavlou,
2002]. The log transformation of the variable is consistent with this argument.

IV. FINDINGS
Heterogeneities in Dispersion in Price and Number of Bidders
Two dispersion variables in three e-auction markets were examined by comparing the dispersion of final auction
price and the dispersion of the number of bidders. One important observation to be made regards the various ways
researchers calculate price dispersion—for example, range, standard deviation, variance, and gaps between various
prices (e.g., Baye et al., 2006). The use of different measures in different studies is perhaps an attributable cause of
the mixed findings in the previous studies [Pan et al., 2004]. The question of why different measures engender
different results remains unanswered [Pan et al., 2004] and is beyond the scope of this study. To find a thorough
discussion of these measures, see Rupert, Gatti, and Kattuman [2003] and Scholten and Smith [2002]. Despite the
2
myriad ways to calculate price dispersion, the two most commonly used variables in the literature are variance (s )
and coefficient of variation (Cvar; a ratio of standard deviation of prices to mean prices). We report and discuss both
the variance and coefficient of variation for our variables of interest.
H1a and H1b state that there is heterogeneity in dispersion of final auction price and the number of bidders for a
commodity across the three e-auction markets. Our analysis confirmed that there is heterogeneity of variance in the
two variables. Table 3 displays the means, variances, and coefficients of variation statistics. Table 4 presents the
paired comparison of F-statistics across the three e-auction markets. As expected, the dispersion of final auction
price across the three markets was statistically significantly different for the U.K. versus U.S. market and the
Australian versus the U.S. market. The results indicated relatively similar degrees of price dispersion in the
Australian and U.K. markets. The Australian and U.K. markets displayed significantly lower dispersion in price
(smaller final price variance) than that of the United States (higher final price variance) (see Table 3). The findings
provide support for H1a.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Dispersion Variables
Australia
United Kingdom
United States
Final Auction Price
Mean (US $)
163.07
158.88
135.60
2
Variance (s )
356.08
384.55
2,512.01
Coefficient of Variation (Cvar)
11.57
12.34
36.97
Number of Bidders
Mean (per auction)
2
Variance (s )
Coefficient of Variation (Cvar)

11.40
20.16
39.39

8.86
9.12
34.09

9.70
22.75
48.87

Table 4: Summary of Homogeneity of Variance Test (Paired Comparisons of F-Values)
Australia vs. United Australia vs.
United States vs.
Kingdom
United States
United Kingdom
Final Auction Price
1.08
7.05***
6.53***
Number of Bidders
2.21***
1.13**
2.49***
* Significant at p ≤ 0.10, ** Significant at p ≤ 0.05, *** Significant at p ≤ 0.01
d.f. of Australian sample = 230, d.f. of U.K. sample = 341, d.f. of U.S. sample = 1,077
Additionally, the results suggest significant heterogeneity in variance of the number of bidders across the markets in
the three countries (all paired comparisons of F-values, p ≤ 0.01). The highest fluctuation in the number of bidders
was in the U.S. market. The number of bidders per auction in Australia and the U.K. was less dispersed than in the
U.S. market. As shown in Table 3, the least dispersion in terms of the number of bidders was in the U.K. market.
These findings provide support for H1b.
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Heterogeneities in Predictors of Auction Success Factors
A regression analysis was performed separately on each of the three datasets from the different countries to obtain
a more comprehensive picture of e-auction success predictors (in terms of predicting final auction price). H2 states
that there is heterogeneity in the combination of factors that predict final auction price for a commodity across the
three e-auction markets. The three e-auction markets differed in their combination of predictors of auction success.
As expected, the level of variance explained in the final auction price by the combination of predictor variables was
2
different across the three e-auction markets, as evidenced by the range of R values (see Table 5). These
differences suggest that heterogeneities exist across the markets.
Opening bid positively influenced final auction price in all three markets (see Table 5). Auction duration negatively
effected final auction price in the Australian market, positively effected price in the U.K. market and was not
significantly related to price in the U.S. market. The number of bidders was positively associated with final auction
price in the U.K. and the U.S. markets, but was not statistically significant in predicting final auction price in the
Australian market.
Table 5: Summary of Final Auction Price Regression Models
Australia
United Kingdom
United States
Opening Bid
0.17**
0.12*
0.88***
Auction Duration
- 0.12*
0.27***
0.00
Number of Bidders
0.10
0.13**
0.39***
Ln (Positive Feedback +1)
0.11
- 0.25***
0.23***
Ln (Negative Feedback +1)
- 0.23***
- 0.11
- 0.16***
2
R
0.07
0.14
0.61
* Significant at p ≤ 0.10, ** Significant at p ≤ 0.05, *** Significant at p ≤ 0.01
Note: All regression models were significant at p < 0.05. All VIF values were found less than 3.00.
Seller feedback (both positive and negative) was a significant predictor in the U.S. market. No significant influence of
negative feedback in the U.K. market and positive feedback in the Australian market was found. However, the
negative feedback score was the only feedback variable that significantly influenced final auction price in the
Australian market. Surprisingly, the positive feedback score was negatively related to the final auction price in the
U.K. market.
To test for statistically significant differences among regression models, Chow’s test was performed on each pair of
regression results [Chow, 1960]. The Chow test is used to determine whether the same relationship between
independent and dependent variables holds for different subgroups. Chow’s statistic is distributed as an F-statistic
under the null hypothesis that the two regressions being tested belong to the same regression [Chow, 1960]. The
results show that there are statistically significant differences in the combination of factors that predict final auction
price across the three e-auction markets (see Table 6). All the test statistics were significant at p ≤ 0.01. The results
of the test indicated that heterogeneity existed in the combination of factors that predict final auction price across the
three e-auction markets. These test results provide support for H2.
Table 6: Comparing Regression Models (Chow’s Test)
Australia vs.
Australia vs.
United States vs.
United Kingdom
United States
United Kingdom
Final Auction Price
Chow’s Statistic
623.06***
151.97***
49.31***
d.f. for numerator
8.00
8.00
8.00
d.f. for denominator
557.00
1,293.00
1,404.00
*** Significant at p ≤ 0.01

V. DISCUSSION
The prime objectives of this study were to demonstrate heterogeneity in price and bidder dispersion across different
e-auction markets and to show that e-auction success for a commodity in different markets was influenced by
different sets of variables. The results above helped achieve these objectives. We found that the Australian and U.K.
markets were least dispersed in final auction price. The U.K. market was also least dispersed in the participation
from online bidders. The U.S. market was found most dispersed both in terms of final auction price and number of
bidders participating in auctions. Such results provide evidence that heterogeneity exists in the dispersion of final
auction price and number of bidders across e-auction markets.
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Contributions to Theory
Several factors can be used to explain the heterogeneities in price dispersion across the three auction markets. Two
of these factors are market maturity levels and seller heterogeneities [Ancarani and Shankar, 2004; Baye et al.,
2004b; Bock et al., 2007; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Rupert et al., 2003; see Table 1]. Significantly higher price
dispersion was found in our study in a more mature (i.e., older) market—the U.S. market—when compared to the
two other markets. The eBay business started in the U.S. in 1995—many years before eBay expanded to the U.K.
and Australia (both were launched in 1999). While this finding signified the role of market maturity in explaining price
dispersion, our results were in the opposite direction to those reported in earlier studies [Bock et al., 2007;
Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000]. In fixed-price markets, it was found that immature markets solicited higher price
dispersion [Bock et al., 2007; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000]. As markets become more mature, prices will arguably
converge because of more buyers in the market [Bock et al., 2007]. While this may be true in fixed-price or
traditional markets, it may not hold true for an e-auction market. As the number of buyers grows larger, so may the
number of sellers in e-auction markets. While in fixed-price markets sellers may be very similar, the growing number
of sellers in a more mature e-auction market may actually create more heterogeneity among sellers. This is
especially true for e-auction markets such as those found on eBay that support C2C transactions.
Sellers’s heterogeneity was claimed to be a source of price dispersion [Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000]. We argue
that the reputation/feedback systems found in many e-auction markets help magnify sellers’ heterogeneities. During
the initial development of e-auction markets, sellers are generally homogeneous. As the market grows and produces
more transactions, the feedback to the sellers and the entry of new sellers increasingly differentiate sellers’ quality.
Some researchers shed light on the role of the number of competing firms and its influence on price dispersion
[Ancarani and Shankar, 2004; Baye et al., 2004b]. Rupert, Gatti, and Kattuman [2003] found that price dispersion,
measured by range, increased from 20 percent to 40 percent when the number of firms changed from two to nine
(i.e., price dispersion increased from 20 percent of the minimum price to 40 percent of the minimum price). Thus, we
believe that examining the effect of market maturity alone on price dispersion is insufficient. The intertwining role
between market maturity and sellers’ heterogeneities should be more thoroughly investigated to uncover its
influence on price dispersion.
Another contribution of our study is the examination of the dispersion in the number of bidders, a form of dispersion
that is rarely investigated. Unlike the fixed-price market, e-auction markets offered us an opportunity to put this
dispersion under a microscope. We argue that market structure plays an important role in shaping such dispersion,
at least for commodity products. In our study, the larger U.S. market consisted of many more sellers (i.e., 601 unique
sellers) than the other two markets studied. We argue that the larger U.S. market may create an opportunity for
bidders to choose from a larger pool of sellers according to their feedback scores. In smaller markets, this
opportunity is likely to decrease.
The regression models (Table 5) showed differences in the set of variables that significantly influence e-auction
success for a commodity in each market. Despite their uniqueness, opening auction bid was one variable that held
its significant explanatory power for final auction price across the three e-auction markets. Its relationship to final
auction price was in the same direction across the three e-markets. When used to predict final auction price, it varied
in explanatory powers across the three countries.
We examined the opening bids at a more granular level. The analysis demonstrated that sellers in the Australian
and U.K. markets were more uniform in terms of their opening bid strategies. They typically started their auctions
with lower prices—that is, beginning bids were lower than AU$1.00 and £1.00 in the Australian and U.K. markets,
respectively. Approximately 70 percent of Australian sellers and 63 percent of British sellers adopted this strategy.
Starting an auction in that price range helps avoid paying higher eBay listing fees. In contrast, U.S. sellers were
more diverse in using different ranges of opening bids. Approximately 52 percent of the U.S. sellers started their
auctions with beginning prices lower than US$1.00. It is interesting to note that 26 percent of the U.S. sellers started
their auctions with opening bids greater than US$50.00, whereas only 11 percent and 15 percent of the Australian
and U.K. sellers, respectively, adopted similar strategies. The uniform opening bids in the Australian and U.K.
markets can perhaps be one of the contributing factors that promotes lower price dispersion in the two markets.
Appendix A provides additional support for the uniformity and diversity of opening bid strategies in the three eauction markets. The variance of opening bids found in the Australian and U.K. markets was much lower than that of
the U.S. market.
Our study additionally demonstrated that prior findings in the e-auction area hold their validity mostly in the U.S.
market. Because most prior auction research was conducted in the U.S. market, we argue that it is impractical or
perhaps detrimental for businesses in one country to take lessons learned in other countries and directly apply them
to their market without a thorough understanding of their own market structure. For instance, while Australian and
U.K. sellers should pay more attention to devising their auction duration strategies in order to promote their final
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prices, U.S. sellers are freer to choose different durations for their auctions. The final price in this market does not
depend upon sellers’ auction duration strategies (see Table 5). We believe that the insignificant relationship between
auction duration and final price in this market stemmed from its relatively large customer base. More than 6,000
unique U.S. bidders participated in this sample. This large customer base allowed U.S. sellers to sell their products
quickly despite the auction duration.
Sellers in the Australian and U.K. markets were more tightly clustered around specific auction durations. Appendices
A and B provide evidence that U.S. sellers used a wide variety of auction duration strategies. In other words, the
U.S. sellers were more diverse in the use of their auction duration strategies, compared to the Australian and U.K.
sellers. We conducted a Chi-Square test and it confirmed this argument. The test indicated that the U.K. auctions
were significantly more uniform in the use of auction duration than those in the two other countries. As shown in
Appendix B, the distribution of auctions across different auction durations appears more even in the U.K. market with
the exception of the ten-day auctions.
It is interesting to note that there appears to be a learned behavior as indicated by the distribution of auction
durations in the U.S. auction market. The majority (61 percent) of the U.S. sample adopted one-day and three-day
auctions—relatively short duration auction formats. Auction sellers in the market might observe that longer exposure
of their auctions did not necessarily improve final auction price. Hence, they opted to use these auction formats to
expedite the transaction and improve the product turnaround time.
The analysis further indicates that the influence of auction duration on final auction price is more complex than
previous studies suggested. The U.K. market was the only market where auction duration significantly improved final
auction price. We found no significant influence on final price in the U.S. market. More interestingly, its relationship
to final auction price in the Australian market was negative and significant. The direction of the relationship between
these two variables was in the reverse direction with the average number of bidders per auction (Australia = 11.40
bidders, U.S. = 9.70 bidders, and U.K. = 8.86 bidders). The negative relationship can perhaps be explained by
factors such as buying behavior of Australian bidders or availability of the products in the regular retail market, which
renders itself as a future research opportunity.
Analysis of feedback scores in the regression model unveiled interesting results. We found that while feedback
scores (both positive and negative) can be influential to final auction price in the U.S. market (see Table 5), they did
not produce similar results in the other two markets. The negative feedback was the only feedback variable that
significantly influenced final auction price in the Australian market. Thus, we argue that in a more competitive market
where there are many sellers from which buyers can choose, such as the U.S., sellers must excel in all areas. The
U.S. sellers generally face more intense competition when selling commodities. Therefore, their feedback scores
become a more valuable asset that can help them achieve higher price premiums when compared to the sellers in
the two other markets.
2

A few unexpected findings deserve special attention. First, the highest R in the final auction price regression model
was reported from the U.S. dataset. While heterogeneities in auction success predictors were hypothesized, the
relatively low explanatory power of the combination of predictors in the Australian and U.K. markets was not
expected. Second, the feedback scores (both positive and negative), especially in the U.K. market, did not manifest
significant explanatory power similar to those found in prior research studies. Finally, sellers in the U.K. market
generally were more experienced (as reflected by higher overall feedback scores) than those in the U.S., despite the
fact that the U.S. market is an older online auction market (see Appendix C). These findings all point to the need for
more research in this area.

Pragmatic Guidelines
Before discussing guidelines for different auction members, it is important to understand different sets of goals and
priorities of different members in the e-auction environment. Specifically, using the concept of incentives in
Information Systems [Ba et al., 2001], we argue that the views of different business participants in the e-auction
environment regarding the optimum level of dispersion in price and number of bidders may differ. For instance,
sellers’ goals include both selling their items and maximizing final auction prices; however, they may find the latter
goal more important. Furthermore, e-auction sellers may prefer lower levels of dispersion in price and number of
bidders compared to bidders who may view high dispersion in final auction prices and dispersion in the number of
bidders as opportunities to gain financial savings. Excessively low dispersion in final auction prices may reduce
bidders’ opportunities to gain financial savings. This lack of dispersion may lower participation from online bidders.
The auctioneers such as eBay, on the other hand, may view materialized auctions as their first priority because they
can receive final value fees only if an item is sold. Thus, the incentives to use the lower opening bid strategies may
help auctioneers attain their goals but can be detrimental to sellers’ overall revenues. An additional goal of
auctioneers may be to promote optimal price variability to avoid a fixed-price characteristic in their market. Online
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auctioneers generally consider developing a mechanism that allows some price dispersion. Without this dispersion,
e-auction markets can lose their unique charisma of being able to provide bargains and potentially become fixedprice markets.
Taking the different sets of goals and their priorities into account, we propose different sets of guidelines for different
business partners in e-auction markets. Electronic auction sellers should take into consideration the time-sensitive
nature of their products and their market demand. Electronics, such as iPods, may be more suited to sell in a market
that provides assurances in terms of the number of bidders. If sellers can gain similar final auction prices in different
markets, the Australian and U.S. markets could be more favorable choices for a quick sale of commodities at an
acceptable price. Auction duration, especially in the U.S. market, did not significantly influence final auction price.
With such freedom, sellers can manage their inventory and avoid obsolescence in their products by using shorter
auctions without sacrificing their revenue.
A number of guidelines to online auctioneers are offered. First, special attention should be given to promoting an
optimum level of dispersion in price and number of bidders in each market. Excessively low dispersion in a market
can be harmful to their businesses. Relatively small variances in final auction price suggest that markets for
commodities could be moving toward fixed-price markets. Lower price dispersion was found in the smaller markets,
such as the Australian and U.K. markets, compared to the larger U.S. market. Although economic theory predicts
that prices converge in efficient markets, such a market characteristic can be detrimental to e-auction businesses
because it provides little incentive for bidders to participate. This fixed-price nature may propel bidders and later
sellers away from the market. Therefore, online auctioneers may consider promoting final auction price fluctuations
through their reduced listing fees. More uniform strategies of sellers’ opening bids were found in these relatively
smaller markets compared to the larger U.S. market. We recommend that an intelligent agent be developed and
used to provide suggestions to sellers who attempt to sell multiples of similar items. In the process of listing their
items, sellers can be given options of using lower or higher opening bids according to their previous auction listings.
Such a practice can later enhance price dispersion in the auction markets.
An intelligent agent program can also be used by online auctioneers to make other important suggestions to their
sellers. For instance, online auctioneers can develop a program to monitor how frequently different sellers use each
auction duration. If one specific duration is excessively being used, the program may prohibit sellers from choosing
such an option so that diversities in auction duration strategies are enhanced. However, such a program should take
into consideration the relationship between auction duration and final auction price in different markets. For instance,
a suggestion for sellers to use shorter auction durations, such as one-day or three-day auctions, may not be
beneficial to the auctioneers in the U.K. market, since this shorter duration can significantly reduce final auction
prices.
Second, online auctioneers should investigate the use of payment intermediaries in their markets and later consider
providing different bidder protection policies that are customized to each market. Although payment options are
rarely discussed in auction research, some (such as PayPal) provide added protection to the bidders and may
influence how seller feedback scores affect final auction price. Generally eBay bidders are protected by PayPal
when they make purchases from sellers whose feedback scores meet a certain feedback score requirement set by
PayPal. An examination showed that the majority of the U.S. sellers (greater than 96 percent) offered PayPal as one
of their alternative payment methods. We found a much smaller adoption rate of PayPal in the Australian market
(less than 40 percent). The low PayPal adoption rate may be one of the contributing factors that diminished the
effect of seller feedback scores on final auction price. Thus, promoting the use of this payment intermediary may
stimulate the effect of feedback scores on auction success and later allow higher dispersion in final auction price and
number of bidders.
Because sellers’ feedback scores are influential in shaping final auction prices, we also encourage online
auctioneers to consider allowing buyers to award different feedback scores according to the value of the auction
items to expedite sellers’ reputation building processes. For example, eBay is currently giving one feedback score
(positive, neutral, or negative) for each transaction regardless of the transaction values. In a less mature market,
such as the Australian market, online auctioneers may consider adopting a different rule by allowing auction winners
to give higher feedback scores to sellers of more expensive products. Online auctioneers can also encourage
auction winners to leave feedback scores for sellers by giving them incentives such as eBay bucks—a form of credit
that their users can use for future purchases. This proposed feedback policy can increase diversity in the sellers
which in turn can promote price dispersion in their marketplaces.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Like other studies, our research faces some constraints and limitations. As we are the first to bring evidence of
heterogeneity in dispersion of both final auction price and number of bidders into the literature, some of the findings
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need additional theoretical support. The findings in the U.S. auction market were more in line with those in prior
studies and consistent with prior online auction theories. Several theories that explain differences in national culture
may not be applicable in this study. For example, the U.K. market now embraces customers from several countries,
making it difficult to identify bidders’ nationalities. Thus, using a well-known theory such as Hofstede’s [1980] cultural
dimensions theory to explain the risk-averse nature of customers in this market could produce bias in a study.
While it is possible for buyers to buy from eBay sites other than their place of residence (our study indicated a very
small percent of cross-country bidding), our results demonstrated that additional work is needed to examine the
predictors of e-auction success in multiple markets. A result from one market may not necessarily be useful in
others. While the regression model explained 61 percent of the final auction price variance in the U.S. market, it
explained only 14 percent and 7 percent of variances in the U.K. and Australian markets, respectively. More
research attention should be given to study the predictors of final auction prices outside the U.S. Our findings
suggest that a smaller market (a market with fewer buyers and sellers) is more likely to resemble a fixed-price
market than a larger market. To explain more of price dispersion, one may consider including factors outside the
markets, such as changes in the retail values, offering new and substitute products, and other related factors in
future works. Many of these factors are not endogenous from the auction markets and are mostly under the control
of product manufacturers and, therefore, can have an influential impact on dispersion of prices and customers.
The product that was used in this study, although it was a universal product, was a time-sensitive product. While our
data were collected in a relatively short time frame (i.e., a two month period), one may argue that prices of this
product changed over the period of data collection. We encourage researchers in this area to include more product
varieties in the analysis in order to examine the affect of product heterogeneity on price dispersion thoroughly. Bock,
Lee, and Li [2007], for instance, found that price dispersion is significantly higher in relatively low-priced products
compared to that of higher-priced products. Another limitation stems from the exclusion of factors outside the eauction markets from the analysis. Price fluctuation is generally an outcome that reflects demand and supply in a
certain economy. Our regression model employed only factors found in the eBay system.
One of our goals was to demonstrate that auction success, in different e-markets, was influenced by different sets of
2
factors. Despite a relatively high R for the final auction price regression model from the U.S. dataset, one may find
our model rather parsimonious. A more sophisticated and complex model, such as one that includes reserve price
and buy-it-now variables, can be included in future research. Qualitative factors such as the use of images in the
page design and page layout design were also not included in the study and provide opportunities for future
research.
Our study was the first to examine not only final auction price dispersion but also number of bidders dispersion in eauction markets. Previously, we addressed the adverse effect of excessively low dispersion. We also believe that
excessively high dispersion of final e-auction price and number of bidders can impede market growth. Thus, we
encourage future research to study and define the ranges of optimum dispersion of these two variables. In addition,
we encourage a replication of our work in different auction settings. Future studies that compare dispersion in hardclosing and soft-closing (ending time is extendable) e-auction formats will provide interesting insight for research in
this domain.
Our study addressed how influential sellers’ strategies and reputations are to final auction price. Bidding strategies
can also be included in future research. Bapna, Goes, Gupta, and Jin [2004] developed different online bidder
profiles according to their strategies. One of these profiles was labeled opportunists, who are generally last-minute
bidders. Researchers can examine how bidders’ strategies affect fluctuation of e-auction success. We expect that
auctions with a larger number of opportunists may face higher dispersion in auction price and number of bidders.
Such bidders’ strategies variables can also be studied together with auction format. Their interactions and effect on
e-auction success can be further investigated. Another opportunity for research on bidders’ strategies is the theory
of flow [Csikszentmihalyi, 1988]. The application of flow theory to Information Technology relies on shoppers’
perceived balance of challenge and skill [Guo and Klein, 2009]. Researchers could investigate the relationship of
bidder profiles and flow characteristics during online bidding.
To examine heterogeneities of predictors of auction success factors, we adopted models from previous studies that
included five auction variables (opening bid, auction duration, number of bidders, sellers’ positive and negative
feedback). A further examination of how such variables interact and the impact of their interaction on final auction
price can perhaps produce meaningful findings for research in this domain. We found that sellers who chose to open
their auctions with higher starting prices are more likely to adopt longer auction durations. We believe that using
longer auction durations helps mitigate the risk of having a nonmaterialized auction. The interaction between
opening bid and auction duration has significant influence on final auction price, but only for the U.S. sample. There
is, however, little improvement in variance explained of final auction price (0.4 percent), as it is highly correlated with
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the opening bid variable (VIF = 10.60). We encourage future research to further examine how auction variables
interplay with one another and craft a more comprehensive final auction price model.
In the current study, less than 1 percent of the bidders engaged in cross-country bidding. Of these few cross-country
bidders, only two won the auctions. Researchers can further investigate how sellers’ willingness to participate in
cross-country transactions will influence their premiums and the fluctuation of final auction price in their markets.
Last but not least, we encourage future studies to examine the role of bidders’ search results on e-auction success.
From our data cleaning experience, we found that the Australian market experienced much cleaner item listings
(much less irrelevant auctions from the searching activities). Bidders in such an environment, therefore, can
compare different auctions more easily. In the U.S. dataset, we found several irrelevant products such as iPod
accessories. These types of auction listings could prohibit bidders’ comparison processes and their identification of
external reference prices. These irrelevant auction items may be additional contributing factors that increase price
and bidder dispersion in the U.S. market.

VI. CONCLUSION
In this study we presented emerging evidence of the heterogeneities of dispersion in price and number of bidders
and the combination of factors that predict market success across e-auction markets, specifically, Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. A characteristic of e-auctions is to provide new markets for sellers, potential
bargains to bidders, and new business opportunities for online auctioneers. The future of e-auctions lies in their
ability to avoid becoming fixed price markets. Understanding heterogeneities across e-auction markets benefits the
participating members by providing guidelines to avoid becoming fixed price markets.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF AUCTION SUCCESS PREDICTORS
Table A-1: Predictors of Auction Success: Descriptive Statistics (Means and Variances)
Australia
United Kingdom
United States
Opening Bid (US $)
17.60
20.05
30.92
(1,612.83)
(1,445.52)
(4,294.18)
Auction Duration (Days)
4.62
4.03
3.69
(5.95)
(6.81)
(5.66)
Positive Feedback
130.73
443.78
342.35
(46,864)
(5,573,141)
(2,703,953)
Negative Feedback
0.82
2.08
2.92
(4.75)
(74.65)
(386.02)

APPENDIX B: AUCTION DISTRIBUTIONS BY THEIR DURATIONS
Table B-1: Distribution of Auctions by Auction Durations
Australia
United Kingdom
United States
1 Day
18 ( 7.79%)
92 (26.90%)
338 (31.35%)
3 Day
111 (48.05%)
103 (30.12%)
324 (30.06%)
5 Day
24 (10.39%)
53 (15.50%)
132 (12.24%)
7 Day
61 (26.41%)
76 (22.22%)
278 (25.79%)
10 Day
17 ( 7.36%)
18 ( 5.26%)
6 ( 0.56%)
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Figure B-1. Auction Distribution by Durations

Figure B-2. Auction Distribution by Durations (Percentage)

APPENDIX C: SELLER DISTRIBUTION BY FEEDBACK SCORES
Table C-1: Distribution of Sellers in Different Markets by Feedback Scores
Australia
United Kingdom
United States
0
3 (3.19%)
5 (3.25%)
10 (1.66%)
1-25
38 (40.43%)
40 (25.97%)
201 (33.44%)
26-50
8 (8.51%)
25 (16.23%)
90 (14.98%)
51-100
14 (14.89%)
23 (14.94%)
86 (14.31%)
101-250
18 (19.15%)
33 (21.43%)
104 (17.30%)
251-500
6 (6.38%)
9 (5.84%)
42 (6.99%)
501-1,000
5 (5.32%)
10 (6.49%)
34 (5.66%)
>1,000
2 (2.13%)
9 (5.84%)
34 (5.66%)
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Figure C-1. Australia: Overall Feedback Scores

Figure C-2. United Kingdom: Overall Feedback Scores

Figure C-3. United States: Overall Feedback Scores
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